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Digital Evidence and the Adversarial System: A
Recipe for Disaster?
Colton Fehr*
Abstract
Scholars have observed that the adversarial system tends to provide courts with
only a ‘‘small snapshot of the technological whole,” which in turn forms the record
upon which broader legal pronouncements occur. As a result, they contend that
legislatures should be more proactive in making rules governing complex and
rapidly advancing technologies, and that courts must show deference to these rules.
Other scholars retort that, in practice, legislatures often fail to update obviously
flawed and outdated privacy provisions. Whether due to special interest influence,
majoritarian dislike of criminal suspects, or other institutional constraints,
legislative responses have been wanting. As such, courts must often play a pivotal
role in governing novel technologies. To help courts bear their burden more
effectively, I make two general proposals. First, when courts must make or decide
on the constitutionality of a rule, I suggest that the legislature should utilize the
reference procedure, which is not inhibited by traditional trial constraints. Second,
to aid courts in applying existing rules, I recommend tasking an independent
institution with providing up-to-date reports of the current state of technologies
expected to come before the courts. Counsel may use such complex and timely
research to address gaps in technological evidence at trial.

INTRODUCTION
In the digital age, the capabilities of new and often complex digital
technologies1 change substantially over short periods of time. As digital evidence
appears in courtrooms at an ever-increasing rate, judicial decisions concerning
the legality of digital device searches and seizures have exposed weaknesses in the
adversarial system of judicial decision making. As various scholars have
concluded, the adversarial system tends to provide courts with only a ‘‘small
snapshot of the technological whole.”2 In other words, judges are often forced to
*

1

2

BA (Saskatchewan), JD (Saskatchewan), LLM (Toronto), PhD Candidate (Alberta). I
would like to thank Professor Steven Penney and the external reviewer for their
invaluable insights on previous drafts of this article. I would also like to acknowledge the
generous support of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for
funding this and related work.
Throughout this article I use the term ‘‘digital” to describe anything which incorporates
computer technologies.
See Daniel Scanlan, ‘‘Issues in Digital Evidence and Privacy: Enhanced Expectations of
Privacy and Appellate Lag Times” (2012) 16 Can Crim L Rev 301 at 302; Steven Penney,
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decide digital legal issues based on inadequate evidentiary records. Judges
operating within the adversarial process are therefore disadvantaged when
attempting to create clear rules or when interpreting legislation which governs
the searches and seizures of digital technologies.3
Despite the existence of cogent examples of these problems,4 scholars have
considered few means to alleviate these issues related to the treatment of digital
evidence. In this article, I make two recommendations. First, when courts must
make or decide on the constitutionality of a rule in a case involving digital
technologies,5 I suggest that the legislature should utilize the reference procedure,
which is not inhibited by traditional trial constraints. Second, to aid courts in
applying existing rules that govern the treatment of digital technologies, I suggest
that legislatures should task a body of neutral and impartial experts with
informing the legal community of the current state of technology and its likely
direction in the foreseeable future. Counsel may use such complex and timely
research — which many overworked criminal lawyers cannot feasibly be
expected to undertake6 — to further their cases at trial. I contend that both
recommendations will permit courts to make better informed and timelier
decisions with respect to digital technologies.
The article unfolds as follows. I begin in Part I with an overview of the
literature discussing the difficulties that judges encounter when creating and
applying rules with respect to digital technologies. Although many scholars
contend that these issues lead to the conclusion that courts should show
significant deference to legislatures when deciding issues related to digital
evidence, others have provided cogent reasons to reject this solution. In Part II, I
provide a detailed example of the types of difficulties that courts have faced with
respect to digital evidence by outlining the development of the law concerning the
constitutionality of searching cell phones incident to arrest. In Part III, I discuss
the aforementioned recommendations in further detail. In so doing, I use the
discussion in Part II to test the feasibility of the suggestions offered.

3

4
5

6

‘‘The Digitization of Section 8 of the Charter: Reform or Revolution?” (2014) 67 SCLR
505 at 530; Stephen Breyer, ‘‘Our Democratic Constitution” (2002) 77 NYU L Rev 245 at
261-63; Graham Mayeda, ‘‘My Neighbour’s Kid Just Bought a Drone . . . New
Paradigms for Privacy Law in Canada” (2015) 35 NJCL 59 at 79-81; Jordan Fine,
‘‘Leaving Dumb Phones Behind: A Commentary on the Warrantless Searches of Smart
Phone Data Granted in R v Fearon” (2015) 13 CJLT 171 at 177-181.
See Orin Kerr, ‘‘The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths
and the Case for Caution” (2004) 102 Mich L Rev 801 at 858-859, 869.
Examples will be discussed below.
As I discuss below, the jurisprudence with respect to searching cell phones incident to
arrest provides a clear example.
See David Paciocco, ‘‘Proof and Progress: Coping with the Law of Evidence in a
Technological Age” (2013) 11:2 CJLT 181 at 185.

DIGITAL EVIDENCE AND THE ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM

439

I. DIGITAL TECHNOLOGIES AND THE ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM
It is common knowledge that judges operating within the adversarial system
are generally required to base their decisions on written factums and oral
arguments submitted by opposing parties. When dealing with rapidly evolving
technologies, the evidentiary records upon which these arguments are made are
often insufficient. This is because there is no guarantee that either party has
sufficient technological knowledge to identify cases in which it is necessary to call
upon expert witnesses to explain the intricacies of a particular technology.7 Even
if a party has sufficient financial resources, the party may not be motivated to
call such evidence if it does not benefit his or her position in the case. 8 Also
aggravating these difficulties is the fact that judges are limited by time and
resource constraints.9 Consequently, judges are often left to deliver legal
pronouncements in an environment that scholars and judges have recognized
as being ‘‘unusually complex.”10
As cases reach higher courts, greater safeguards exist to catch technological
mistakes made in lower courts. Not only do appellate courts employ more law
clerks to research issues,11 but cases at higher courts also tend to attract
interveners who are frequently allowed to make submissions. 12 Nevertheless,
scholars have observed that the inherent lag time between the introduction of
new technologies and their eventual consideration by trial and appellate courts
often renders judicial decisions of ‘‘historical interest only.” 13 It may take many
years before technologies used by suspects or police are legally challenged in a
criminal trial.14 Moreover, if one of the parties appeals, there would be further
delay in waiting for an intermediate appellate court to decide the case. 15 Finally,
if a case is one of the few to be heard by the Supreme Court of Canada (S.C.C.),
the Court’s decision would come many years after the initial search or seizure
took place.16
7
8
9

10
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15

See Kerr, supra note 3 at 875.
Ibid.
Ibid citing Henry Hart Jr., ‘‘Foreword: The Time Chart of Justices” (1959) 73 Harv L Rev
84 at 99-100.
Breyer, supra note 2 at 261; Kerr, supra note 3 at 877.
For instance, the Supreme Court of Canada permits three clerks per judge. See Supreme
Court of Canada, ‘‘Law Clerk Program,” online: <www.scc-csc.ca/about-apropos/
empl/lc-aj-eng.aspx>.
For instance, in R. v. Vu, 2013 SCC 60, 2013 CarswellBC 3342, 2013 CarswellBC 3343,
[2013] 3 S.C.R. 657, [2013] S.C.J. No. 60, at paras 43-44 [Vu], the Court relied upon an
academic article as well as submissions by the Canadian Civil Liberties Association in
rejecting a number of ill-suited metaphors used to justify searches of computers that were
not specifically authorized in a warrant.
See Scanlan, ‘‘Issues in Digital Evidence,” supra note 2 at 312; Kerr, supra note 3 at 868869.
See Kerr, supra note 3 at 868.
Ibid.
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Judges facing these problems are often aware of their limitations and, as a
result, tend to craft broad rules that provide future courts adequate flexibility in
assessing novel circumstances.17 The result, however, is that judicial rules
governing novel technological devices are often highly indeterminate. Law
enforcement officers tasked with implementing such rules will generally favour ex
post judicial determination of the legality of their conduct as they are generally
less concerned with upholding constitutional rights, and more preoccupied with
ensuring crime is detected and thoroughly investigated.18 This leads to frequent
litigation that perpetuates the challenges involved with creating expedient and
informed decisions.
In comparison to courts, scholars contend that legislatures are institutionally
better equipped to govern complex and rapidly changing technologies. One
reason for this is that they are in theory able to move more quickly to address
evolving technologies, even in some cases legislating before technologies are in
mainstream use.19 Tracing the extensive American history of privacy protections
for a variety of novel technologies, scholars have concluded that ‘‘[c]ongress
rather than the courts has shown the most serious interest in protecting privacy
[in] new technologies.”20 Although the Canadian literature is sparse, similar
assertions have been made with respect to Canadian legislatures. 21
A second advantage of legislative over judicial regulation is the former’s
superior informational capacity and responsiveness to citizens’ preferences. 22
Legislatures commonly hear from a diverse array of groups, ranging from
independent commissions to special interest organizations. 23 Even if the
16

17
18

19

20

21

22

Ibid. For an excellent example, see the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R. v.
Fearon, 2014 SCC 77, 2014 CarswellOnt 17202, 2014 CarswellOnt 17203, [2014] S.C.J.
No. 77, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 621 [Fearon], dealing with the constitutionality of searching cell
phones incident to arrest. In the American context, Professor Kerr provides a number of
examples in his article supra note 3 at 869-870.
For an excellent example, see Fearon, supra note 16 at paras 83-84.
See Kerr, supra note 3 at 869-870; James Stribopoulos, ‘‘In Search of Dialogue: The
Supreme Court, Police Powers, and the Charter” (2005) 31 Queen’s LJ 1 at 48-50 citing
Jerome Skolnick, Justice Without Trial: Law Enforcement in Democratic Society (New
York: MacMillan, 1994) at 12.
See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) [Riley] (opinion of Justice Alito) at 6 [Riley];
Kerr, supra note 3 at 870-871.
See Kerr, supra note 3 at 857 and Erin Murphy, ‘‘The Politics of Privacy in the Criminal
Justice System: Information Disclosure, the Fourth Amendment, and Statutory Law
Enforcement Exemptions” (2013) 111 Mich L Rev 485 at 535-536.
The leading example is found in Steven Penney’s article ‘‘Reasonable Expectations of
Privacy and Novel Search Technologies: An Economic Approach” (2007) 97 J Crim L &
Crim 477 at 504-505.
Ibid at 501. See also Kerr, supra note 3 at 875; Breyer, supra note 2 at 261-264; Penney,
‘‘The Digitization of Section 8,” supra note 2 at 531; Marc Blitz, ‘‘Video Surveillance and
the Constitution of Public Space: Fitting the Fourth Amendment to a World that Trades
Image and Identity” (2004) 82 Texs L Rev 1349 at 1421.
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legislative process does not initially strike an appropriate balance of interests,
democratic discourse will tend to result in legislatures abandoning rules which
provide insufficient privacy or security protections.24 As discussed above, the
ability of courts to access such information is constrained by the scope of the
judicial function within the adversarial system.
Other scholars argue, however, that courts are better suited to govern
privacy interests in digital technologies.25 They assert that courts are more
independent and therefore less susceptible to special interest influence or
majoritarian dislike of criminal suspects, who are disproportionately members of
disadvantaged minorities.26 Indeed, scholars in the United States and Canada
have found that law enforcement agencies and corporations play an outsized role
in shaping privacy policy given their ‘‘clear and constant voice in the political
process.”27
These scholars have also found that legislatures are often unable or unwilling
to update ‘‘obviously flawed and outdated provisions.”28 Legislative responses to
privacy issues are instead ‘‘largely reactive, targeting industries on a case by case
basis, and often responding only after extreme instances of privacy
infringement.”29 Other American studies show that the degree of protection
23
24
25

26

27

28
29

See Penney, ‘‘Reasonable Expectations,” supra note 21 at 501.
See Kerr, supra note 3 at 881.
See Blitz, supra note 22 at 1363; Lawrence Lessig, Code: Version 2.0 (New York: Basic
Books, 2006) at 222-223; Christopher Slobogin, Privacy at Risk: The New Government
Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007) at
201; William Fenrich, ‘‘Common Law Protection of Individuals’ Rights in Personal
Information” (1996) 65 Fordham L Rev 951 at 958; Daniel Solove, Nothing to Hide: The
False Trade-off Between Privacy and Security (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011)
at ch 17; Daniel Solove, ‘‘Fourth Amendment Codification and Professor Kerr’s
Misguided Call for Judicial Deference” (2005) 74 Fordham L Rev 747 at 761; David
Sklansky, ‘‘Two More Ways Not to Think about Privacy and the Fourth Amendment”
(2015) 82 U Chicago L Rev 223 at 224.
See Lessig, supra note 25 at 216-22; Sklansky, supra note 25 at 227; Murphy, supra note 20
at 535-536; Penney, ‘‘Reasonable Expectations,” supra note 21 at 505-506. See also Kent
Roach, Due Process and Victims’ Rights: The New Law and Politics of Criminal Justice
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999).
See Murphy, supra note 20 at 533-535; Donald Dripps, ‘‘Constitutional Theory for
Criminal Procedure: Dickerson, Miranda, and the Continuing Quest for Broad-butShallow” (2001) 43 Wm & Mary L Rev 1 at 46; Solove, ‘‘Fourth Amendment
Codification,” supra note 25 at 763-767; Solove, Nothing to Hide, supra note 25 at 165167; Sklansky, supra note 25 at 227; Fenrich, supra note 25 at 958, 966. Professor Penney
has warned of similar dangers in the Canadian context. See Penney ‘‘Reasonable
Expectations,” supra note 21 at 502-506. It is notable that Kerr, supra note 3 at 859
suggests that legislatures are not lobbied in the criminal law context. His reasons for this
assertion are, however, contradicted by the extensive study of Murphy, supra note 20.
Her conclusions are summarized at 535-536.
Ibid.
See Fenrich, supra note 25 at 966. See also Murphy, supra note 20 at 498, 500-501; Solove,
‘‘Fourth Amendment Codification,” supra note 25 at 771.
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provided by federal statutes is much more likely to turn on whether the
information sought is useful to investigations than on widely shared notions of
the degree of privacy expected in whichever property is searched. 30 For instance,
access to one’s driving, email, health, and personal credit records are disclosable
upon administrative request, while video and cable records demand significantly
heightened evidentiary requirements.31
Scholars have also observed that case-by-case adjudication allows litigants to
force rule-making even in the absence of legislative action.32 In support of this
observation, scholars have identified many instances where legislatures have been
found to be woefully inefficient in enacting privacy laws.33 Even though judges
often create broad and indeterminate rules, judicial rule-making at least
guarantees the incremental, evolutionary development of policy in response to
changing technological and social circumstances.34
Given the above review, it would be imprudent to downplay the role played
by courts in governing digital privacy. Instead, it appears that both courts and
legislatures have pivotal roles to play, as each institution brings different benefits
to governing privacy in the digital age.35 As such, it is prudent to think of ways to
help judges operating within the adversarial system bear their burden more
effectively. Before considering such options, however, it will prove useful to
provide a more detailed example of the problems faced by courts when governing
digital devices. A review of the judicial development of the law with respect to
searches of cell phones incident to arrest will serve this purpose. Not only will
this example bring the above issues into better focus, it will also provide a factual
basis to test the recommendations discussed below in Part III.

II. CELL PHONE SEARCHES INCIDENT TO ARREST
As the capacity and use of modern cell phones increases, police have taken
greater interest in searching cell phones as part of the common law power to
search incident to arrest.36 As the S.C.C. had previously prohibited,37 or
30
31
32
33

34
35
36

37

See Murphy, supra note 20 at 506 citing Slobogin, supra note 25 at 184.
Ibid.
See Sklansky, supra note 25 at 227; Murphy, supra note 20 at 535.
Ibid. The Privacy Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-21 provides an excellent Canadian example, as it
has not been substantially updated since 1983. See Jennifer Stoddart, ‘‘Letter to the
Editor from Privacy Commissioner Jennifer Stoddart regarding proposed lawful access
legislation,” Letter to the Editor, Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (12
November 2012).
See Sklansky, supra note 25 at 227; Murphy, supra note 20 at 535.
Murphy, supra note 20 at 490, 537-538 makes a similar point.
For the requirements of a valid search incident to arrest, see R. v. Caslake, 1998
CarswellMan 1, 1998 CarswellMan 2, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 51, [1998] S.C.J. No. 3, 121 C.C.C.
(3d) 97 [Caslake].
See R. v. Stillman, 1997 CarswellNB 107, 1997 CarswellNB 108, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 607, 1997
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modified,38 the legal framework for conducting particularly invasive searches
incident to arrest, a variety of courts have heard argument that cell phone
searches ought to be prohibited as unjustifiable violations of s. 8 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter), which protects the rights of all
Canadians to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. 39 In R. v. Fearon,
the Court accepted the Crown’s argument that conducting such searches was
necessary for three reasons. First, public safety required searching phones to
ensure suspects were not calling criminal backup.40 Second, searching a cell
phone will sometimes be necessary to preserve evidence due to the threat of
remote deletion.41 Third, searching phones may lead police to new evidence
which would otherwise be lost.42 Many technological arguments have been
advanced to both undermine and support these points.

A. Passwords and Biometric Identification
Most cases concerning the scope of cell phone searches incident to arrest
arose before the prevalence of smartphones.43 As a cursory review of the
jurisprudence reveals, many of the ‘‘dumb” phones44 at issue were not password
protected.45 With the advancement of smartphone technology, however, users
became more protective of the information in their phones. This likely explains
why password protection has become ubiquitous among cell phone users. 46 Yet,
as Daniel Scanlan posited long before the S.C.C.’s decision in Fearon: ‘‘[t]here is
no mechanism at law to force an accused to disclose a password and, if any such
measures were created, they would not likely survive constitutional scrutiny.” 47

38

39

40
41
42
43

44
45

46

S.C.J. No. 34, 144 D.L.R. (4th) 193 [Stillman] where the Court concluded that bodily
samples could not be taken incident to arrest. See also R. v. Godoy, 1998 CarswellOnt
5223, 1998 CarswellOnt 5224, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 311, [1998] S.C.J. No. 85 [Godoy] where it
was concluded that houses could not be searched incident to arrest.
See R. v. Golden, 2001 S.C.C. 83, 2001 CarswellOnt 4253, 2004 CarswellOnt 4301, [2001]
3 S.C.R. 679 [Golden] where the Court required a higher threshold for conducting strip
searches incident to arrest.
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982 being schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982,
c. 11.
See Fearon, supra note 16 at para 48.
Ibid at para 49.
Ibid at para 46.
See Peter Svensson, ‘‘Smartphones now Outsell ‘Dumb’ Phones,” Newshub (28 April
2013), online: <www.newshub.co.nz/technology/smartphones-now-outsell-dumbphones-2013042912>.
‘‘Dumb” phones are those which can only receive calls and text messages.
R. v. Giles, 2007 BCSC 1147, 2007 CarswellBC 3299, [2007] B.C.J. No. 2918, 77 W.C.B.
(2d) 469 (B.C.S.C.) [Giles] is the only pre-Fearon decision involving a locked phone.
See Colton Fehr, ‘‘Cell Phone Searches Incident to Lawful Arrest: A Case Comment on
the Ontario Court of Appeal’s Decision in R. v. Fearon,” case comment on R. v. Fearon
(2014) 60 Crim LQ 343 at 356.
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Subsequent to the Fearon decision, Jared Biden and I expanded on this
view.48 We asserted that the Court in Fearon failed to undertake a full
constitutional analysis due to the lack of password protection and biometric
identification evidence submitted in the case.49 If an accused is required to
provide a password, we argued that the accused’s self-incrimination rights are
unjustifiably violated.50 Similarly, requiring an accused to speak into a phone
arguably violates the right to silence.51 Finally, conscripting fingerprints or retina
scans constitutes a warrantless seizure which raises s. 8 constitutionality issues
which were not considered by the Courts.52 Although these considerations are
arguably less intrusive compared to the warrantless search of a cell phone,
conscripting passwords or biometric information adds to the severity of the
overall intrusion.53
If there is merit to the argument that police cannot demand password or
biometric evidence,54 then the Crown’s arguments in Fearon are significantly
undermined. The desire to preserve evidence from remote deletion, to inquire as
to whether criminal backup is being requested, or to discover evidence which is
temporally vulnerable is only possible if the police have ‘‘prompt” access to the
phone.55 Yet, modern smartphones can thwart such access. Only in rare
instances, such as through use of the pairing method,56 can police enter a
password-locked phone quickly. Otherwise, police will generally have to rely
47

48

49

50
51
52
53
54

55
56

See Daniel Scanlan, Digital Evidence in Criminal Law (Aurora: Canada Law Book, 2011)
at 214 citing R. v. Beauchamp, 2008 CarswellOnt 2756, [2008] O.J. No. 1347, 58 C.R. (6th)
177, 171 C.R.R. (2d) 358 (Ont. S.C.J.) at paras 18, 66.
See Colton Fehr & Jared Biden, ‘‘Divorced from (Technological) Reality: A Response to
the Supreme Court of Canada’s Reasons in R v Fearon” (2015) 20 Can Crim L Rev 93.
For an interesting discussion (and similar conclusion) in the border context, see Robert J.
Currie, ‘‘Electronic Devices at the Border: The Next Frontier of Canadian Search and
Seizure Law?” (2016) 14 CJLT 289 at 314-317.
See Fehr & Biden, supra note 48 at 95. The phone in Fearon was not password protected
and did not require biometric identification to enter the phone.
Ibid at 103.
Ibid.
Ibid at 104-105.
Ibid.
For an opposing view see Steven Penney, ‘‘‘Mere Evidence’? Why Customs Searches of
Digital Devices Violate Section 8 of the Charter” (2016) 49:2 UBC L Rev 485 at 517 (see
note 152 and the sources cited therein).
See Fearon, supra note 16 at paras 49, 59, 66.
As we observe supra note 48 at 101-102, ‘‘if police have access to a computer which the
iPhone has previously been connected to, they will be able to bypass the security function
. . . Even if the police have access to an iPhone, [however] the user may prevent searches of
this sort as ‘users [can] encrypt their hard drives to protect their pairing record.’” We cite
in support of this view technology expert Andy Greenberg’s article ‘‘Despite Apple’s
Privacy Pledge, Cops Can Still Pull Data Off a Locked IPhone,” Wired (18 September
2014), online: <www.wired.com/2014/09/apple-iphone-security/>.
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upon the ‘‘brute force” method, which involves a machine rapidly inputting
passwords until it finds the correct code.57 Yet, even with basic four-digit
passwords, this process can take many hours.58 Moreover, a program can be
installed to shut down the phone after a certain amount of attempts. 59 This is
precisely the type of technology which significantly restrained the FBI’s ability to
enter into the San Bernardino shooter’s smartphone.60 These and similar security
technologies are also currently preventing Canadian police from searching cell
phones in numerous criminal investigations.61
Despite the above-mentioned barriers to entering cell phones ‘‘promptly,”
the state of the technology has hardly been considered in the jurisprudence. 62
Although the Crown may be able to justify any breach arising from demanding a
password or biometric identifier, it is the fact that these obvious issues were not
considered by courts that illustrates the general problem with courts deciding
cases that involve digital evidence issues.63 At best, the constitutionality of
searching locked cell phones incident to arrest — the majority of cell phones
today64 — remains ambiguous post-Fearon. At worst, the Court’s decision in
Fearon became inapplicable to most cell phone searches incident to arrest the
moment it was rendered.

57
58

59
60

61

62

63

64

See Fehr & Biden, supra note 48 at 102.
Ibid citing Adam Rouse, ‘‘Apple and Google Make the Next Generation of Smartphones
More Secure,” (17 November 2014), online: <blogs.kentlaw.iit.edu/islat/2014/11/17/
apple-and-google-make-the-next-generation-of-smartphones-more-secure/>.
Ibid.
See, ‘‘FBI Breaks into iphone of San Bernardino Shooter without Apple’s Help,” CBC
News (28 March 2016), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/technology/fbi-san-bernardinoiphone-break-1.3509899>. The 2015 San Bernardino shooting was a terrorist attack in
San Bernardino, California. The FBI seized the accused’s cell phone but, upon
attempting to search it, were obstructed by a variety of security features on the cell phone.
See Daniel Seglins, Robert Cribb & Chelsea Gomez, ‘‘RCMP Want New Powers to
Bypass Digital Roadblocks in Terrorism, Major Crimes Cases,” CBC News (15
November 2016), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/investigates/rcmp-digital-roadblocks1.3850018>.
The Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in R. v. Fearon, 2013 ONCA 106, 2013
CarswellOnt 1703, [2013] O.J. No. 704, 114 O.R. (3d) 81, 296 C.C.C. (3d) 331 (Ont.
C.A.), affd 2017 SCC 77, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 621 at para 75 [Fearon ONCA] arguably makes
this suggestion when it concluded that a warrant was required for locked phones, but not
unlocked phones. It is unclear if the Court was considering whether the accused’s
expectation of privacy was higher as a result, or if the Court realized the difficulties
officers would have in entering a phone.
I feel comfortable making this claim as the basic arguments (detailed more thoroughly in
the article supra note 48) were published in a peer-reviewed journal.
See Svensson, supra note 43.
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B. Battery Removal
With respect to the rationale regarding the preservation of evidence,
numerous courts,65 as well as academic commentators,66 have asserted that
any deletion of cell phone data could be prevented if an officer removes a battery
from a cell phone. As I explain elsewhere, cell phone content cannot be deleted
when a phone is turned off.67 As long as the officer reboots the phone within an
area that is isolated from the phone’s cellular network, any remote-control
deletion attempts will be thwarted.68 As such, it is arguable that any concern
about remote destruction of evidence on a phone — which was forcefully argued
by the Crown in Fearon — is without merit.
The issue that judges and commentators have failed to address concerns the
way in which computers store data. Computers store a significant amount of
data permanently on a hard drive.69 However, not all data is stored on the hard
drive. Random Access Memory (R.A.M.) stores frequently used program
information in a temporary manner.70 The benefit of using R.A.M. is that it
significantly increases the speed of a device.71 Removing the battery from a
computer or phone, however, risks losing memory stored on the R.A.M. 72 As
such, removing the battery does not provide a perfect solution as it risks losing
potentially incriminating evidence. Although computer developers have,
subsequent to Fearon, made significant progress with respect to making
R.A.M. less volatile,73 the technology was much less capable when lower
courts began deciding whether cell phone searches incident to arrest were
constitutional.74

65

66
67
68
69
70
71
72

73

74

See the dissenting reasons in Fearon, supra note 16 at para 144; R. v. Liew, 2012 ONSC
1826, 2012 CarswellOnt 3686, [2012] O.J. No. 1365, 100 W.C.B. (2d) 256 (Ont. S.C.J.) at
para 144; R. v. Hiscoe, 2011 NSPC 84, 2011 CarswellNS 852, 310 N.S.R. (2d) 142, [2011]
N.S.J. No. 615 (N.S. Prov. Ct.), affd 2013 NSCA 48, 297 C.C.C. (3d) 35, 1 C.R. (7 th) 350
(C.A.) at para. 15 [Hiscoe N.S.P.C.]; R. v. Cater, 2012 NSPC 2, 2012 CarswellNS 37, 312
N.S.R. (2d) 242, [2012] N.S.J. No. 22 (N.S. Prov. Ct.) at para 32 [Cater].
See Fehr, supra note 46 at 352-353.
Ibid.
Ibid.
See Scanlan, Digital Evidence, supra note 47 at 159-167.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid at 160. See also Tim Schiesser, ‘‘Guide to Smartphone Hardware: Memory and
Storage,” Neowin (12 March 2012), online: <www.neowin.net/news/guide-to-smartphone-hardware-37-memory-and-storage>.
See Sean Gallagher, ‘‘Memory that Never Forgets: Non-Volatile DIMMs Hit the
Market,” Arstechnica (4 April 2013), online: <arstechnica.com/information-technology/2013/04/memory-that-never-forgets-non-volatile-dimms-hit-the-market/>.
Ibid. The issue was first decided in Giles, supra note 45 in 2007.
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C. Faraday Bags
A number of courts and scholars have also suggested that placing a phone in
a Faraday bag would prevent any risk of remote control deletion.75 Faraday bags
are designed to prevent a phone from receiving any signals when powered on,
and are relatively inexpensive.76 As such, it was argued that a police officer could
simply place a phone into one of these bags to prevent remote control deletion. 77
However, as Daniel Scanlan observes, ‘‘these bags are not always completely
effective at blocking transmissions.”78 Moreover, Faraday bags do not prevent
‘‘logic bombs” from operating.79 A logic bomb is designed to overwrite
information if a triggering event (such as entering a particular code) does not
occur within a period of time.80 Again, in the context of the adversarial trial,
many courts were not presented with evidence of the existence of Faraday bags,
let alone evidence explaining its frailties. Regardless of the lack of evidence, even
the narrow minority in Fearon accepted without question the feasibility of
battery removal and Faraday bags preventing destruction of evidence.81

D. Smartphones vs ‘‘Dumb” Phones
In Fearon, the majority concluded that courts ‘‘should not differentiate
among different cellular devices based on their particular capacities when setting
the general framework for the search power.”82 In failing to draw a distinction
between the device and its data, courts have been criticized for missing an
opportunity to distinguish smartphones from less sophisticated ‘‘burner” or
‘‘dumb” phones.83 The latter generally have fewer features, significantly lesser
capacity, and are much more difficult to trace as they are not connected to G.P.S.
technology.84 As one author observes, the two types of phones are ‘‘too distinct
to bear any categorical similarities besides the capacity for emailing,
photographing, and making and receiving calls.”85 Yet, the Court’s governing
framework failed to give appropriate weight to these basic technological
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differences. As a result, the Court’s framework has been criticized for risking
serious privacy intrusions, as smartphones provide a vast portal into intimate
personal details, while dumb phones do not.86 This is not to say that
distinguishing between smart and dumb phones is simple. However, ignoring
the significant differences between the privacy interests in each type of phone is
hardly more palatable.
Of equal concern is the assumption that officers searching a smartphone will
be able to conduct the nuanced types of searches allowed by the Court. The
Court permitted searching ‘‘only recently sent or drafted emails, texts, photos
and the call log.”87 As such, the intrusiveness of a cell phone search appears to be
low. Yet, as Jordan Fine observes, conducting such searches on modern
smartphones is much more complex:
Unless law enforcement has been given precise testimony as to where in
a device discoverable evidence can be found, an indefinite search
through data will have to be made. Even if police received a tip that
photographic evidence existed on a phone, its location would be a
mystery. Would it be in Instagram, a photo sharing application, or is it
hidden on the SD card? If the evidence is a text message, is it in a
common messaging platform like WhatsApp, or encrypted inside
TextSecure?88

In rejecting a pre-Fearon rule developed in R. v. Polius,89 which permitted police
to conduct a ‘‘cursory” search of a cell phone incident to arrest, Professor Steven
Penney made a similar observation:
The problem is the indeterminacy of ‘‘cursory.” Depending on the
nature of the device and its operating system, quantity and type of
information contained in it, sophistication of the police examining it,
and other factors, the intrusiveness of a cursory search may vary
greatly.90

Given the fundamental differences between searches of smartphones and dumb
phones, it is unlikely that these courts had the evidence necessary to fully
appreciate the way each type of phone would be searched. As the courts were
likely conscious of this evidentiary lacuna, it was only reasonable for the majority
in Fearon to have developed a vague rule, as it gave future courts flexibility in
deciding cases with more robust factual records.91
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E. Cell Phone Capacities
A number of lower court decisions failed to focus on the technological facts
addressed above. Instead, these decisions focused primarily on the degree of
privacy that an accused had in his or her cell phone.92 In so doing, judges
frequently employed questionable metaphors in deciding that cell phone searches
were permissible incident to arrest. By comparing digital storage devices to filing
cabinets, briefcases, and cupboards, appellate courts, as well as a multitude of
trial courts, relied on precedents that permitted such physical searches in
upholding the lawfulness of cell phone searches incident to arrest.93
By relying upon such metaphors, however, the courts overlooked both
qualitative and quantitative differences with respect to modern smartphones. 94
These phones contain substantially more information (much of which is private),
store records of every action taken on the device, retain information even after
users believe the evidence is destroyed, and permit access to information not ‘‘in”
the cell phone itself.95 Given the lack of consideration of these differences, a
surprising number of lower courts significantly downplayed the privacy interests
that an individual has in his or her modern cell phone.96
One plausible explanation for the reliance by courts on illogical analogies lies
in the adversarial system’s tendency to focus on the narrow facts of a case. In the
cases dealing with dumb phones, the capacity of the phone at issue was
significantly less than any smartphone. An analogy to a briefcase or an address
book makes much more sense in this context. At least one court explicitly stated
that it was relying exclusively on the technological capabilities of the dumb
phone at issue when relying on such a metaphor.97 However, this also reveals a
different problem: the failure of the adversarial system to consider a complete
picture of available and foreseeable technology. When making rules within this
92
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environment, it is unlikely that the common law will keep pace with the privacy
interests implicated by searches of modern digital devices.

III. MODIFYING THE ADVERSARIAL FRAMEWORK
Given the evidentiary shortcomings that tend to arise when courts decide
issues relating to complex digital technologies, it is necessary to consider options
that better equip courts to decide future cases. In my view, legislatures should aid
courts in deciding these types of cases in two primary ways. First, legislatures
should utilize the reference procedure when requiring courts to make or decide
on the constitutionality of a rule concerning a complex digital technology.
Second, legislatures should make accessible to counsel up-to-date and
independent expert reports describing technologies that are expected to come
before courts. The merits of each recommendation are explained in turn.

A. Reference Procedure
The federal government may refer to the S.C.C. virtually any question of law
pursuant to s. 53 of the Supreme Court Act.98 The provinces are to be notified of
any question in which they have a ‘‘special interest,” and are entitled to make
submissions before the S.C.C.99 The Court also has jurisdiction to notify any
‘‘interested parties” of the proceedings and allow those parties to make
submissions.100 The Court may even direct that specific counsel argue the case
brought before the Court.101 Finally, the Court may bring forward any ‘‘papers
or other proceedings had or taken before any court, judge or justice of the peace,
and that are considered necessary with a view to any inquiry, appeal or other
proceeding had or to be had before the Court.”102
Utilizing the reference procedure in cases where courts are tasked with
making or deciding on the constitutionality of a rule with respect to complex
digital technologies has several benefits. First, the reference procedure avoids the
adversarial system’s tendency to hear insufficient evidence from limited
parties.103 In the context of a reference, the Court may hear from any party or
take evidence from any proceedings. The Court may even call on parties to argue
a particular legal issue. This procedure therefore allows the Court to build the
best possible evidentiary record for deciding a question of law. Though courts
deciding whether a search of a cell phone incident to arrest was constitutional
would sometimes hear from an expert, the vast majority of courts did not have
98
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the benefit of expert testimony.104 One might speculate that the costs of hiring an
expert were at least partially responsible for the lack of expert evidence submitted
in these cases. Given the academic criticism of the Court’s decision in Fearon, it
appears that intervener submissions also failed to adequately update the
evidentiary record. Use of the reference procedure, however, would have
allowed the Court to address this informational deficit by calling its own experts.
Second, a reference can ensure that courts deciding issues pertaining to novel
search technologies do not render decisions of ‘‘historical interest only.” 105
Bypassing first instance trials and provincial appeals helps ensure that rules
concerning novel search technologies are made within a reasonable amount of
time. This benefit is again exemplified by observing the judicial development of
the law of cell phone searches incident to arrest. The first judicial decision to
address this issue arose in 2005.106 Although the technology of cell phones
improved dramatically between 2005 and 2014, when the S.C.C. rendered its
reasons in Fearon, it was certainly possible to foresee by the mid-2000s that cell
phones would come to have basic features, such as password and biometric
protection, which would make prompt access difficult without help from the
user. As such, a reference to the S.C.C. in the mid-2000s could have resulted in an
informed legal opinion that fully canvassed cell phone technology and would
have remained relatively current even today.
Finally, the reference procedure ensures that privacy issues are considered by
a neutral arbiter. As discussed earlier, several scholars have observed that courts
are better suited than legislatures to govern privacy with respect to
disadvantaged minorities such as criminal accused.107 However, scholars have
also contended that this concern is counterbalanced by the fact that courts are
institutionally less capable of developing an informed evidentiary record. 108 By
utilizing the reference procedure, however, these concerns are assuaged. Not only
does the court ensure that the issue is considered by a neutral third party, it is
also provided with significantly more information than typically provided by the
adversarial system.
Despite the above benefits, it may be retorted that utilizing the reference
procedure to develop rules with respect to digital technologies is problematic.
The fact that the S.C.C.’s answer to a reference question is not binding on lower
courts arguably means that the reference process will not affect how lower courts
approach digital evidence cases, as they may simply ignore reference opinions
and decide the issue based on the factual record before them.109 However, this
104
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criticism ignores the S.C.C.’s conclusion that reference opinions are ‘‘of highly
persuasive weight.”110 In fact, no lower court has ever exercised its discretion to
ignore a reference opinion.111 As such, it is reasonable to conclude that such
opinions would be followed by lower courts unless the technology at issue
changed in a legally relevant way.
It may also be argued that use of the reference procedure unduly sacrifices
the benefit of having multiple courts opine upon the legality of searching a digital
device. This criticism, however, is of limited merit. First, as discussed in Parts I
and II, courts tend to make their decisions with respect to the legality of
searching a digital device in an inadequately informed evidentiary environment.
Any rules developed in this context are therefore of limited utility. Second, the
reference procedure permits the court to draw upon a variety of perspectives. Not
only will the Crown raise arguments, but interveners may also apply to, or be
solicited by, the court to make submissions, and experts may be called to provide
relevant testimony. Therefore, the benefits of having multiple lower court
opinions are significantly offset. Third, requiring that resources be concentrated
in one hearing is more efficient than bringing arguments (some of which are
bound to overlap) before multiple courts. As such, the benefits of utilizing the
reference procedure when courts must make or decide on the constitutionality of
a rule with respect to complex technologies likely outweigh any costs.
Finally, it may be argued that there are political obstacles that make this
proposal unlikely to work in practice. In other words, it may be difficult to
convince legislatures to send such issues to the courts via the reference procedure.
True as this may be, the reference procedure still provides a neutral process
wherein the government can defend its preferred method for governing a digital
technology. As such, a responsible legislature should view the reference process
as more pragmatic than expending significant resources on multiple trials
wherein a rule will be subject to constitutional challenge and/or developed with
inadequate evidence.

B. External Aid
As cases are appealed, intervener briefs are sometimes cited by high courts to
help correct factual assumptions.112 Yet, as seen in Part II, intervener briefs were
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incapable of filling the informational lacuna during the development of the law
regarding searching cell phones incident to arrest. As Professor Murphy explains,
this is likely because institutions that defend privacy, such as civil liberties
associations, are not able to expend necessary resources due to limited funding
which is divided between numerous civil rights issues.113 As such, there should be
a more reliable means for courts and counsel to become informed of relevant
digital evidence. This is necessary, as the vast majority of digital cases will not
involve making or deciding on the constitutionality of a rule, rendering the
reference process of limited utility. Instead, courts will need assistance applying
established rules to often complex digital facts.
One way of addressing this issue is to provide counsel with independent, upto-date, and readily available information about digital technologies expected to
come before the courts. This proposal is obviously vague, and raises at least two
general questions. First, what types of questions would the courts need
answered? Second, who would counsel turn to for independent advice?
The jurisprudence concerning whether searching cell phones incident to
arrest is constitutional is illustrative of the types of questions courts need
answered. Determining how such a search takes place, when the search may be
thwarted, and the nature of the privacy interests implicated by the search were all
integral to deciding the constitutional issues related to cell phone searches. As
technologies are generally in development long before they are released, these
questions could have been answered at an early stage. For instance, as the first
smartphone was developed in 1992,114 it is reasonable to conclude that those in
the industry could have predicted the mass adoption of smartphones by the time
the courts first decided the issue in 2007.115 Likewise, password and biometric
security features have long been available to computer users. Given the increased
privacy interests implicated by modern cell phones, it was reasonable to assume
by the mid-2000s that the technology would continue developing in a manner
that would make it increasingly difficult for police to promptly enter cell phones
or prevent the destruction of evidence.
Although experts can be called at trial to serve a similar function, the
adversarial system provides no guarantee that the Crown or defence will call such
evidence. Indeed, of the eight main cases ruling on the constitutionality of cell
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phone searches incident to arrest, the trial judge relied on expert testimony in
only one of them.116 This is especially problematic as courts operating within the
Canadian adversarial model are not permitted to call their own experts, as is
possible in some civil117 and common law118 jurisdictions. Even if Canadian
courts could call their own experts, this sort of aid may not be desirable from an
economic standpoint. Frequent resort to experts would be expensive. Given the
increased frequency with which judicial decisions can be expected to implicate
complex digital evidence, it is desirable to consider less costly ways for courts to
avail themselves of necessary information.
To this end, it may be prudent for Parliament to task an independent
institution with providing detailed and up-to-date overviews of technologies
which are expected to come before the courts. Counsel could then choose
whether to rely on this evidence during a trial. An institution that would be
suitable for providing such advice would be the Office of the Privacy
Commissioner of Canada (O.P.C.), or other similar provincial bodies. 119 The
O.P.C. operates independently from government,120 and its purpose is to
‘‘protect and promote the privacy rights of individuals.”121 Although its mandate
is currently restricted to overseeing compliance with Canada’s main privacy
acts,122 their office could be tasked with providing detailed overviews of
technologies which are expected to arise in the jurisprudence. 123 Indeed, the
O.P.C. would be well-suited to such a role, given its expertise in issues relating to
116

117
118

119

120

121
122

123

In Cater, supra note 65 the court relied on expert evidence. The courts in Fearon ONCJ,
supra note 93; Hiscoe NSPC, supra note 65; Liew, supra note 65; Polius, supra note 89; R.
v. Manley, 2011 ONCA 128, 2011 CarswellOnt 803, [2011] O.J. No. 642, 269 C.C.C. (3d)
40 (Ont. C.A.) [Manley]; R. v. Finnikin, 2009 CarswellOnt 8955, [2009] O.J. No. 6016, 87
W.C.B. (2d) 902 (Ont. S.C.J.); R. v. Otchere-Badu, 2010 ONSC 1059, 2010 CarswellOnt
1295, 87 W.C.B. (2d) 29 (Ont. S.C.J.) [Otchere-Badu] did not rely on expert evidence.
For instance, see German Code of Civil Procedure (5 December 2005), s. 404.
For instance, see U.S. Fed. R. Civ. P. 53. The appointment of law and technology expert
Lawrence Lessig as a ‘‘special master” (who serves effectively as an expert witness)
proved useful in the landmark digital case of United States v. Microsoft Corporation, 253
F 3d 34 (2001).
In Alberta, for instance, see ‘‘Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner of
Alberta,” online: <www.oipc.ab.ca/>. I do not mean to suggest that the various offices
of privacy commissioners would be the only suitable institution. The now disbanded Law
Reform Commission of Canada would also have been a suitable candidate. As it is no
longer in existence, however, I will not entertain this potential avenue for addressing the
problems raised by digital evidence and the adversarial system.
Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (OPC), ‘‘Who we are,” online:
<www.priv.gc.ca/en/about-the-opc/who-we-are/>.
Ibid.
Ibid. The OPC particularly oversees the Privacy Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-21 [Privacy Act]
and Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c. 5
[PIPEDA].
For an example of what such a report would look like, see Office of the Privacy
Commissioner of Canada, “What an IP Address Can Reveal About You” (May 2013),

DIGITAL EVIDENCE AND THE ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM

455

privacy which, in today’s day and age, it is reasonable to assume includes an indepth knowledge of complex digital technologies.
Two main criticisms of this proposal merit comment. First, as the O.P.C. has
a mandate of protecting privacy, it may be perceived as biased against legitimate
security interests. Either explicitly or implicitly, those researching the relevant
digital technologies may conduct research that they believe tends to bolster
privacy-based arguments. This problem could, however, be offset in two ways.
First, Parliament could explicitly require that the O.P.C. conduct this research in
a neutral manner. Second, even if the research tended to support privacy
interests, the Crown could still call its own experts in reply. As the Crown has
relatively significant resources to expend, it does not seem overly burdensome to
require it to call rebuttal evidence if it has reason to believe that the work of the
O.P.C. is inadequate.
Second, it may be asked whether such a proposal would serve the main
purpose of s. 8 of the Charter: namely preventing unreasonable searches and
seizures.124 Many digital law issues come before courts ex parte as warrant
applications. As defence counsel is not present on such applications, courts
would suffer from the same informational deficit as currently exists. True as this
may be, the proposal here at least better ensures that ex post review will be
conducted with an adequate factual basis. Moreover, if a judge was aware of an
independent report that raised concerns with a warrant application, I see no
reason why the judge could not dismiss or modify a Crown’s application on that
basis. In this way, my proposal at least has the potential to prevent some
unreasonable searches, even if its main function will be to ensure laws are
properly applied ex post.

CONCLUSION
Judges operating within the adversarial system are generally unable to build
an adequate factual record due to the unusually complex and rapidly changing
nature of digital evidence. As such, some commentators have suggested that
courts defer to legislatures to create rules governing digital technologies.
However, other scholars have demonstrated that the ‘‘leave it to the
legislature” argument is no panacea. Although legislatures are, in theory, able
to respond in an informed and diligent manner, they often fail to do so, thereby
leaving it to the courts to create new rules or apply ambiguous legislative rules to
complex digital facts. Scholars have also observed that legislatures often
downplay the privacy interests of individuals, especially those of disadvantaged
minorities such as criminal accused. Given the increasing relevance of digital
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technologies to privacy, it may be preferable to have neutral parties decide digital
evidence issues, especially in the criminal law context.
To ensure courts are institutionally equipped to play this role, it is necessary
to develop means for courts to receive adequate evidence with respect to digital
technologies. I have offered two recommendations to address this issue. First, in
controversial cases where a court must make or decide on the constitutionality of
a rule, I maintain that best practice would involve sending the issue as a reference
question to the S.C.C. Not only does this permit courts to develop a rule
expeditiously, thereby avoiding any eventual judicial decision being of ‘‘historical
interest only,” it also allows the S.C.C. to solicit a fully informed evidentiary
record upon which to develop the law. Second, when a court must apply an
existing rule to a complex digital issue, I suggest that the O.P.C. or a similar
government institution should aid counsel in understanding digital technologies
by providing detailed and impartial overviews of digital technologies expected to
come before the courts. By relying on such reports, counsel can ensure judges are
better equipped to decide digital legal issues.
Devising better ways to govern privacy in the digital age is among the most
pressing challenges facing the modern nation state. As Justice Karakatsanis
recognized in Fearon, ‘‘[when] technology changes, our law must also evolve so
that modern mobile devices do not become the telescreens of George Orwell’s
1984.”125 In other words, effective governance of privacy is necessary to preserve
fundamental rights and freedoms. At the same time, effective surveillance is
necessary to ensure state security. Regardless of one’s opinion on how this
balance is best struck, it is necessary that the institutions governing privacy be
working to their strengths, not their weaknesses.
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